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TITLE 
Two-Stage Decisions Increase Preference for Hedonic Options 
 
ABSTRACT 
When choosing from multiple options, decision-makers may directly choose an option (single-
stage decision), or initially shortlist a subset of options, and then choose an option from this 
shortlist (two-stage decision). Past work suggests that these two decision formats should lead to 
the same final choice when information about the choice alternatives is held constant. In contrast, 
this research demonstrates a novel effect: two-stage decisions increase preference for hedonic 
(vs. utilitarian) options. A regulatory focus account explains this effect. In a two-stage process, 
after shortlisting, decision-makers feel that they have sufficiently advanced their prevention 
goals, and this reduces their prevention focus during the final choice stage. Reduced prevention 
focus, in turn, enhances hedonic preference. Four studies across different decision contexts 
illustrate this effect and support the underlying process mechanism. The findings suggest that the 
formal structure of a decision (single-stage vs. two-stage) leads to systematic differences in 
decision-makers’ choices. 
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Decision-makers make choices using either a single-stage or a two-stage decision 
process. In single-stage decisions, an option is chosen directly from all the available options. In 
two-stage decisions, however, decision-makers first (i) shortlist (or screen) a subset of options 
from all the available options, and then (ii) make the final choice from this shortlist (Beach, 
1993; Potter & Beach, 1994). For example, a manager deciding on a candidate to hire could 
evaluate all applicants’ resumes and choose one candidate (single-stage decision), or she could 
first shortlist some candidates, and then choose one from this shortlist (two-stage decision). 
These decision procedures are formally equivalent; they expose decision-makers to the same 
options and the same information, and so should lead to similar choice outcomes. However, in 
direct contrast to this assumption of procedure invariance (Slovic, 1995), we find that two-stage 
(vs. single-stage) decisions systematically increase preference for choice options that are 
relatively superior on hedonic decision criteria. Further, we illustrate a novel process mechanism 
for this phenomenon that relates to decision-makers’ goals. 
Past work on single-stage decisions versus two-stage decisions has focused on how 
decision-makers utilize information presented at different stages. According to this past work, in 
the final stage of two-stage decisions, decision-makers de-emphasize information that they used 
in the first stage and place greater importance on information that they encountered in the second 
stage (Chakravarti, Janiszewski, & Ülkümen, 2006; Ge, Häubl, & Elrod, 2012). The research 
presented in this manuscript differs from this previous research in two ways. First, distinct from 
past work, we primarily investigate decisions in which all relevant information is provided up 
front in both single-stage and two-stage decisions. In our work, these formats differ mainly in 
whether the decision is formally demarcated into two stages (i.e., shortlist, then choose-from-
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shortlist), or not. No additional information is provided in the second stage. Therefore, we focus 
on how decisions are influenced by the demarcation itself, holding constant the decision inputs. 
Second, we study an important choice outcome that has not yet been examined in the 
literature on two-stage decisions: preference for hedonic versus utilitarian choice options. When 
choosing an option, decision-makers often tradeoff hedonic and utilitarian decision criteria. 
Utilitarian criteria relate to functional aspects, whereas hedonic criteria relate to experiential and 
discretionary aspects (Khan, Dhar, & Wertenbroch, 2005). For example, in the case of job 
applicants, work experience is more of a utilitarian characteristic, whereas humor in business-
related social situations is more of a hedonic characteristic.  
We find that two-stage decisions increase preference for hedonically superior choice 
options. Unlike past results in the two-stage decision literature that were based on information 
processing factors, the mechanism that drives our effect is related to decision-makers’ goals—
specifically, differences in their regulatory focus (Higgins, 1997). We find that shortlisting 
influences the extent to which the final choice is pursued with a prevention goal (i.e., goal of 
avoiding disfavored choice outcomes). In a two-stage process, after the shortlisting stage, 
decision-makers feel that they have sufficiently advanced their prevention goals, which in turn 
dampens the continued activation of prevention focus; however, promotion focus (i.e., goal of 
approaching favored outcomes) does not dissipate. Consequently, this relatively lower 
prevention focus increases preference for hedonic options during the final choice.  
Our work has important theoretical and practical implications. With regard to theory, we 
contribute to the literature on two-stage decision-making, by identifying non-intuitive 
consequences of structuring the choice process as either single-stage or two-stage. Both, our key 
effect about hedonic-utilitarian choices and the underlying goal-related process mechanism, are 
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new to the two-stage decision-making literature. The main insight of our work is the finding that 
a relatively minor procedural difference in the decision process (i.e., whether decisions are 
formally demarcated into two stages or not) leads to systematic effects on decision-makers’ 
choices, despite holding key decision-inputs constant. This finding builds upon prior work on 
how differences in elicitation procedures influence preferences and valuations (Joyce & Shapiro, 
1995; Selart, 1996; Slovic, 1995), by showing how the structure of a decision-process influences 
hedonic preferences.  
With regard to practice, this phenomenon is important for a wide variety of decisions that 
may be demarcated into two stages. Many organizations have a policy of making important 
decisions (e.g., choice of employees, vendors, clients, projects, etc.) in a way that draws attention 
to the demarcated structure of the decision (e.g., shortlist, then choose). Also, many academic 
departments hire new faculty using a two-stage process. Hiring and selection committees might 
find our results relevant and accordingly, take steps to ensure that these two-stage decisions are 
not overly hedonic-slanted. Further, the issue of two-stage (vs. single stage) decisions may be 
particularly relevant to online websites where managers and consumers are prompted to create 
shortlists (e.g., Google Shopping’s “My Shortlist” tool, all-paris-apartments.com’s “shortlist” 
tool, or Human Resources websites with “candidate shortlist” tools). Finally, in personal selling 
contexts, salespeople can suitably structure the sales process as a two-stage process, contingent 
on whether they wish to push hedonic options.   
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Literature Review 
The Decision Scenario 
We examine decision scenarios in which each choice-option comprises a bundle of 
characteristics that are utilitarian or hedonic in nature. To test for differences in hedonic 
preferences, we examine choice sets that have an inherent hedonic-utilitarian tradeoff. More 
specifically, decision-makers choose between options that are relatively superior on hedonic 
criteria, but inferior on utilitarian criteria (e.g., affable candidate with modest expertise) versus 
options that are relatively superior on utilitarian criteria, but inferior on hedonic criteria (e.g., 
boring candidate with excellent work credentials). In the context of such tradeoffs, higher 
hedonic preference is reflected by greater choice share of options that are relatively superior on 
hedonic criteria, compared to other alternatives in the same choice set. This operationalization of 
hedonic preference is consistent with past work on hedonic-utilitarian tradeoffs (Chernev, 2004; 
Kivetz & Simonson, 2006; Vohs et al., 2008). As noted earlier, we predict that two-stage (vs. 
single-stage) decisions lead to an increase in choice share of the relatively more hedonic options.  
In this paper, we examine two types of decision-scenarios. In most studies, in both single-
stage and two-stage decisions, we present all information upfront; the only difference is in the 
structure of the decision-process. In two studies, in the single-stage decision we present all 
information upfront, whereas in the two-stage condition we present the critical information 
upfront, and only some minor information after the shortlisting stage. We predict that increased 
hedonic preference after shortlisting generalizes to both these cases. Further, we do not presume 
that shortlisting must occur in a particular manner (e.g., selection vs. rejection; Levin, Jasper, & 
Forbes, 1998; Chakravarti et al., 2006), or that shortlisting must be based on particular attributes 
(e.g., based on price; Larson & Hamilton, 2012).  
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In our examinations, we acknowledge that it is possible that decision-makers in a single-
stage condition might disregard our experimental instructions and informally compose a shortlist, 
even in a single-stage decision. However, the key point is that two-stage decisions formally 
mandate a shortlist. We highlight this difference in the explicitness and prominence of 
shortlisting as a key feature that distinguishes single-stage and two-stage decisions. In the 
decisions that we examine, only a two-stage format includes an explicit and formal shortlisting 
stage, whereas in a single-stage format the shortlisting stage may (at best) be implicit and hence 
less salient during the decision. Therefore, the difference in decision format is relatively subtle, 
based on the clarity with which the shortlisting stage is demarcated. We focus on this subtle 
difference, and we examine its effect on differences in decision makers’ goals—particularly their 
regulatory focus— and their subsequent effect on hedonic preference. 
Next, we review some key findings from past research on regulatory focus, first 
highlighting how differences in regulatory focus lead to differences in hedonic versus utilitarian 
preferences, and then describing how differences in the decision structure (i.e., two-stage vs. 
one-stage decisions) might lead to differences in regulatory focus. 
Regulatory Focus 
People pursue goals with two regulatory orientations (Higgins, 1997). Prevention-focus 
emphasizes losses (vs. non-losses) and the minimal goal of avoiding disfavored outcomes. 
Promotion-focus emphasizes gains (vs. non-gains) and the maximal goal of approaching most 
favored outcomes. Decision-makers’ operant regulatory focus determines how they value 
hedonic characteristics, relating to pleasure and indulgence, versus utilitarian characteristics, 
relating to functional concerns. Specifically, decision-makers have higher hedonic preference 
under lesser prevention (greater promotion) focus. This follows from research on goal-attribute 
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compatibility, which has shown that when decision-makers’ minimal goals are reduced, this 
increases the importance they place on pleasurable characteristics (Chernev, 2004; Higgins, 
2002; Safer, 1998). We elaborate on this point later.  
Research has shown that prevention focus can influence decisions independent of 
promotion focus (Higgins, 2002). Therefore, much work on regulatory focus has operationalized 
promotion and prevention as orthogonal constructs (Haws, Dholakia, & Bearden, 2010; 
Lockwood, Jordan, & Kunda, 2002). These researchers used separate scales to measure 
prevention and promotion focus, and we follow the lead of such research. Next, we discuss 
changes in regulatory focus during single-stage versus two-stage decisions. 
When entering into any choice, a decision-maker’s baseline regulatory focus depends on 
her trait characteristics (e.g., chronic regulatory focus) and ancillary situational factors, such as 
the choice domain under consideration (Sengupta & Zhou, 2007; Zhou & Pham, 2004). We 
assume that these initial, exogenous factors are held constant across single-stage and two-stage 
decisions, because these factors operate before either decision-path is pursued. However, we 
argue that, once pursued, a two-stage decision process endogenously impacts regulatory focus, 
independent of any influence of the exogenous factors described above. Specifically, we propose 
that which option is ultimately chosen depends on the decision-maker’s prevailing levels of 
regulatory focus at the time of the final decision, and that these levels of regulatory focus are 
likely to be different in single-stage versus two-stage decisions. Next, we explain why this 
difference emerges. 
Regulatory focus in single-stage decisions. We investigate choice sets in which, initially, 
some options are favored and others are disfavored (i.e., a decision-maker might not like all 
options equally). Further, over the course of the choice-process, decision-makers could have 
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promotion objectives, prevention objectives, or hold both objectives concurrently at varying 
levels (Higgins, 1997). For instance, decision-makers may wish to avoid choosing disfavored 
alternatives (a prevention objective), or they may wish to choose their favored alternative (a 
promotion objective). In single-stage-decisions, the final choice is influenced by the levels of 
regulatory focus that prevail immediately after all options have been encountered, since decision-
makers proceed from learning about the options, to directly choosing an option. We are agnostic 
about this baseline—that is, the relative choice share of the hedonic (vs. utilitarian) options—in 
the single-stage condition. However, our key prediction is that the choice share of the hedonic 
options will increase, relative to this baseline, when decisions are structured as two-stage 
decisions. We explain this prediction next.  
Regulatory focus in two-stage decisions. Similar to decision-makers going through a 
single-stage decision process, a decision-maker going through a two-stage decision process also 
initially encounters some favored options and some disfavored options. Two-stage decisions 
include all the initial steps of a single-stage decision. However, as a key point of difference, a 
decision-maker going through a two-stage process takes an added step, after learning about all 
the options but before the final choice. More specifically, she first shortlists her preferred 
options; we predict that after such shortlisting, her relative levels of promotion versus prevention 
focus shift, leading to relatively reduced prevention focus but unchanged levels of promotion 
focus. We derive this prediction based on three complementary sets of arguments.  
First, by the very nature of two-stage decision making, a shortlist will differ from the 
initial set of alternatives examined, in that the shortlist has fewer disfavored options or those that 
are below a minimum standard (Beach, 1993; Levin et al., 1998). Prevention focus is principally 
concerned with the absence or presence of negative outcomes (Crowe & Higgins, 1997). 
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Therefore, we contend that when a decision-maker composes a shortlist, this assuages her 
prevention concerns by drawing attention to the fact that there has been a reduction in the 
presence of relatively disfavored choice options. 
Second, advancing prevention objectives—even partially—leads to subsequent 
deactivation of vigilance concerns (Förster, Grant, Idson, & Higgins, 2001; Van-Dijk & Kluger, 
2004). This result has been shown in studies involving sequential, independent decisions, such as 
solving multiple anagrams (Förster et al., 2001). We build on this finding and suggest that 
similar effects can emerge even within the context of a single decision that is clearly demarcated 
into two stages. We contend that since prevention objectives have been advanced during 
shortlisting, this reduces future prevention goal pursuit, because decision-makers feel they have 
less to lose and can let down their guard (Idson & Higgins, 2000). In other words, after 
shortlisting, there is a belief that prevention concerns are “check-marked”, by actively excluding 
disfavored options out of the initial choice set, and thus prevention focus likely dissipates.  
Third, we do not posit shortlisting to affect promotion focus levels. Promotion focus is 
principally concerned with the absence or presence of favored outcomes (Crowe & Higgins, 
1997). In two-stage decisions, the number of favored choice options should be the same in the 
initial set of alternatives and in the shortlist, because preferred options will typically survive and 
make it into the shortlist. Therefore, the overall effect of shortlisting is primarily a shift towards 
relatively lesser prevention focus after the shortlisting phase. 
We illustrate this shift with a stylized example. Imagine that two groups of people are 
choosing from the same set of options in either a single-stage (Group A) or two-stage (Group B) 
format. If these groups are randomly drawn from the population, then at the start of the choice 
process, both prevention and promotion focus should not differ across groups. Both groups reach 
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a certain level of prevention and promotion focus after examining the initial choice set. For 
Group A, this is the regulatory orientation that prevails during the final choice. In contrast, 
Group B takes an added step; they formally shortlist their preferred options before making a final 
choice. Relative to the critical regulatory orientation at which Group A left off, after shortlisting 
Group B’s prevention focus somewhat dissipates, but their promotion focus sustains. Thus, 
compared to Group A, Group B (who choose in two stages) has reduced prevention focus but 
similar promotion focus right before the final choice, and we propose that this relatively reduced 
prevention focus may lead to differences in final choices between Group A and Group B. 
In sum, past work has mostly identified exogenous factors that influence regulatory focus 
at the start of the choice process (e.g., chronic regulatory focus, product domain, etc.). Here, over 
and above these exogenous factors, we predict that two-stage decisions endogenously produce 
differences in regulatory focus right before the final choice. Next, we discuss the implications of 
this difference for the relative weighting of hedonic and utilitarian criteria in choice of an option. 
Hedonic Versus Utilitarian Characteristics 
In this research, we distinguish characteristics as hedonic or utilitarian by using existing 
definitions in the literature (Khan et al., 2005). More specifically, utilitarian characteristics relate 
to functional aspects, whereas hedonic characteristics relate to multisensory, experiential aspects 
that are more discretionary. Rather than examine preference for these individual characteristics, 
we follow the lead of prior literature and examine holistic preferences for options, noting that a 
preference shift towards options that are relatively superior on hedonic characteristics implies an 
increased emphasis on hedonic criteria (Kivetz & Simonson, 2006; Vohs et al., 2008). 
As mentioned earlier, decision-makers’ operant regulatory focus has been shown to 
influence their relative emphasis on hedonic versus utilitarian characteristics in choice sets that 
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involve a hedonic-utilitarian tradeoff. Research on goal-attribute compatibility has shown that 
relative reductions in prevention focus increase weighting of hedonic characteristics in choices 
(Chernev, 2004). Hedonic characteristics are, by their definition, more discretionary and 
therefore less essential when pursuing a choice with a minimal goal of avoiding disfavored 
choice outcomes. However, upon a reduction in prevention focus, the goal of the choice becomes 
relatively less oriented toward avoiding disfavored alternatives, and this shift correspondingly 
increases the relative importance of discretionary, hedonic characteristics. This occurs even 
when holding constant levels of promotion focus; past work has shown that merely reducing 
prevention focus enhances hedonic preference (Higgins, 2002; Safer, 1998).  
Thus, we predict that during two-stage decisions, the shift to relatively lesser prevention 
focus during the final choice stage should lead to a preference shift towards hedonic options in 
decisions involving a hedonic-utilitarian tradeoff. Formally, we make two predictions, one for 
the key effect on choice shares, and one for the underlying process mechanism:  
 
H1: Choice share of options that are relatively superior on hedonic criteria will be 
relatively greater in two-stage decisions (vs. single-stage decisions). 
 
H2: Relatively lesser levels of prevention focus right before the final choice in two-stage 
(vs. single-stage) decisions, will lead to relatively greater hedonic choice share in 
two-stage (vs. single-stage) decisions. 
 
To clarify these predictions, we are agnostic about the initial level of prevention focus at 
the start of the choice process; this depends on individual differences and various exogenous 
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factors. Likewise, we are agnostic about the exact hedonic choice shares in either single-stage or 
two-stage decisions; these depend on how the options are calibrated. Thus, our prediction is 
about the shift in relative choice shares of the hedonic option, irrespective of the starting 
baseline. As we show in our studies, this shift occurs not because the final choice set is smaller 
(Sela, Berger, and Liu, 2009), but rather because shortlisting makes salient to the decision-maker 
that prevention concerns have been alleviated by a reduction in disfavored options. 
 
Overview of Empirical Studies 
Four studies provide convergent evidence for the hypothesized effects and the underlying 
process mechanism. Each study involves a hedonic-utilitarian tradeoff, with some choice options 
being relatively superior on hedonic criteria (and relatively inferior on utilitarian criteria), and 
some options being relatively superior on utilitarian criteria (and relatively inferior on hedonic 
criteria). In all cases, hedonic-utilitarian tradeoffs in the stimuli are verified via pretests, to 
ensure that some options are perceived as more hedonic (and less utilitarian) than other options. 
We manipulate, between-subjects, single-stage versus two-stage decision formats, and then 
compare final choice shares of the hedonic option.  
To show the generalizability of the hypothesized effect, we test a wide variety of 
managerial and consumer choice contexts across the studies. Study 1 involves a hiring decision 
context, and shows evidence for process using moderation analyses. Study 2 involves an 
apartment choice context, and shows evidence for process using mediation analyses. Studies 3 
and 4 involve consumer choice contexts, and show that the key effects in this paper replicate in 
incentive-compatible choice tasks (i.e., participants actually receive their chosen option) and 
across large choice sets. To show robustness, we demonstrate our effects across different 
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participant profiles (e.g., North Americans vs. Europeans; undergraduates vs. more diverse adult 
participants, etc.). 
 
Study 1: Candidate Hiring  
In Study 1, we wanted to test our prediction concerning choice shares (H1), as well as test 
our hypothesized process mechanism (H2). More specifically, we sought to show evidence for 
process using moderation analyses, and in doing so, we counter various potential alternative 
explanations for the effect on choice shares. We examined a hiring context, typical of many 
organizational settings. Participants were asked to choose a candidate from a set of candidates 
that differed in the extent to which the candidates possessed hedonic and utilitarian 
characteristics. This domain is appropriate for our investigation, because in some organizations a 
candidate is chosen from amongst all applicants in a single-stage decision, whereas in other 
organizations the hiring process is explicitly demarcated into two stages. We predicted that a 
candidate that was relatively superior on hedonic criteria will receive greater choice share under 
a two-stage (vs. single-stage) decision process (H1).  
Further, according to our hypothesized mechanism (H2), the above result occurs because 
shortlisting produces an endogenous reduction of prevention focus prior to the final choice stage. 
To test this process account, we used a moderation-of-process design (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 
2005) in which we manipulated regulatory focus. Because we predict a shift in regulatory focus 
only after the shortlisting stage of the two-stage decision process, and not in single-stage 
decisions, we moderate the hypothesized mechanism that occurs only after shortlisting.  
We used a four-cell design in Study 1. We contrasted a single-stage decision with three 
versions of two-stage decisions: (i) control version with no prime, (ii) a version in which we 
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inserted – after  the shortlisting stage - a prime to increase prevention focus, and (iii) a version in 
which we inserted – after  the shortlisting stage - a prime to increase promotion focus. We 
predict that hedonic choice share will be higher in the two-stage control condition versus the 
single-stage condition. We also predict that the two-stage control condition will have a higher 
hedonic choice share than the two-stage, prevention-focus prime condition, because the inserted 
prevention prime will counteract the endogenous reduction in prevention focus that shortlisting 
precipitates. Lastly, we do not predict differences in choice share between the two-stage control 
condition and the two-stage, promotion prime condition. This pattern of results would suggest 
that our proposed effect is driven specifically by prevention focus, and not by increased attention 
to goal pursuit or other artifacts of the inserted priming task.  
We created a choice set of four candidates (Appendix A) for an Information Technology 
(IT) position. Hedonic characteristics were qualities that would make it fun for other co-workers 
to work with the candidate, such as being affable and interesting. Utilitarian characteristics were 
qualities about the candidates that would make them effective IT workers, such as more 
experience and expertise. The choice set had two relatively superior options (A and C) and two 
relatively inferior options (B and D). We anticipated that participants would eventually choose 
one of the two superior, "target" candidates (A and C), thus reducing the potential variance 
during the final choice stage. Further, to induce a hedonic-utilitarian tradeoff, candidate A was 
designed to have greater hedonic characteristics than candidate C. We imposed a specific number 
of candidates in the initial choice set (four) and the shortlisted set (two), in keeping with past 
work on shortlisting that also involved similar numbers of options (e.g., Ge et al. 2012, 
Experiment 1). In all pretests and studies, we counterbalanced descriptions and labels (and by 
extension, order of options).  
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Pretest 
The pretest examined whether participants viewed candidate A as relatively superior on 
hedonic criteria and inferior on utilitarian criteria compared to candidate C. Participants (N = 40 
mTurk workers) read descriptions for each candidate, and then rated each candidate using two 
five-item scales (both scales, α > 0.85, drawn from Spangenberg, Voss, & Crowley, 1997). For 
the hedonic scale, participants rated how much the candidate possessed “fun,” “exciting,” 
“delightful,” “thrilling,” and “enjoyable” characteristics. For the utilitarian scale, participants 
rated how much the candidate possessed “necessary,” “practical,” “functional,” “helpful,” and 
“effective” characteristics. Participants responded on 7-point scales (1 = “not at all,” 7 = “very 
much”). The ratings confirmed our intended design, as reflected by differences across candidates 
on hedonic ratings (MA = 6.10; MB = 4.02; MC = 3.06; MD = 2.54), with candidate A having the 
highest hedonic rating. Candidates differed on utilitarian ratings as well (MA = 5.75; MB = 3.88; 
MC = 6.51; MD = 3.95), with candidate C having the highest utilitarian rating. Both sets of 
comparisons between candidates A and C were significant (ts(39) > 2.7; ps < .01).  
To examine whether candidates A and C were perceived as superior to candidates B and 
D, respectively, participants were also given two pair-wise choices. They chose between (i) A 
and B (the more hedonic candidates), and then chose between (ii) C and D (the less hedonic 
candidates), separately. All participants chose candidates A and C, over candidates B and D, 
respectively. 
Procedure 
Participants (N = 160 mTurk workers) completed a computer-based online survey, in a 
four-cell (single-stage, two-stage-control, two-stage-prevention, two-stage-promotion) between-
subjects design. The structure of the decision process was either two-stage (shortlist-then-
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choose) or single-stage (straight-choice). On the first webpage, all participants were told that 
they needed to hire an IT staff member for their office. On the second webpage, they read 
information on four candidates, taking as much time as they liked. At this point, they simply 
reviewed the candidates’ profiles and did not make any decisions. As such, all participants had 
the same “awareness set.” On the third webpage, they saw this choice set again, but here 
instructions diverged, contingent on the structure of the decision process. 
Single-stage condition participants picked their chosen candidate by clicking on an 
option. In contrast, participants deciding in two stages were asked to formally shortlist two 
candidates that they would consider further. Then, on a later webpage, they saw all four options 
again, but the non-shortlisted options had inactive radio buttons. We retained the non-shortlisted 
options on this webpage, to ensure that the number of alternatives visible during final choice was 
constant across structure of the decision process. Then, two-stage participants made their final 
choice out of their two shortlisted options. 
There were three versions of the two-stage decision process. The control condition is as 
described above. In other conditions, participants were asked right after the shortlisting stage 
(and before the final choice stage) to respond to a prompt about a decision they have made in the 
past. Specifically, they were asked to write about a time they tried to avoid a bad outcome 
(prevention prime) or about a time they tried to attain a good outcome (promotion prime),  
prompts used in earlier work (Higgins et al., 2001). In these two conditions, after writing their 
response to the prompt, participants returned to the candidate hiring scenario and chose their 
preferred candidate out of the two candidates that they shortlisted. 
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Results 
 Consistent with H1, choice share of the target hedonic option (A) was higher in the two-
stage control condition (60.0%) than in the single-stage condition (34.78%, binomial z = 2.33, p 
< .05; n = 86; see Figure 1). Further, consistent with our regulatory focus mechanism, hedonic 
choice share in the two-stage condition with the prevention prime was low (35.0%), significantly 
lower than that of the two-stage control condition (binomial z = 2.24, p < .05, n = 80), but 
similar to the single-stage condition (binomial z < 1). Finally, unlike in the two-stage condition 
with the prevention prime, hedonic choice share in the two-stage condition with the promotion 
prime stayed relatively high (55.88%), and was similar to the hedonic choice share in the two-
stage control condition (binomial z < 1).1 Thus, consistent with our predictions, only a prevention 
prime (but not a promotion prime) turned off the effect of shortlisting. 
Note that, as expected, all participants in the two-stage conditions shortlisted the one 
superior hedonic option (A) and the one superior utilitarian option (C); no participant shortlisted 
options (B) or (D). Therefore, effectively, during final choice, the range of hedonic and 
utilitarian attributes was similar between the single-stage and two-stage conditions.  
-Insert Figure 1 about here-  
Discussion 
Study 1 makes three points. First, using a hiring scenario, we provide initial evidence that 
two-stage (vs. single-stage) decisions enhance preference for hedonic options (H1). Second, 
consistent with our proposed process mechanism, we find that inserting a prevention-focus prime 
after the shortlisting stage turned off the key effect on hedonic choice shares, whereas inserting a 
promotion-focus prime did not turn off this effect. Thus, reinstating prevention focus reverses the 
                                                      
1 As an aside, and as expected, hedonic choice share was (directionally) higher in the promotion-prime condition, 
than either the single-stage condition (binomial z = 1.89, p = .06, n = 80) or the prevention-prime condition 
(binomial z = 1.81, p = .07, n = 74).   
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effect of shortlisting, and consequently leads to the same lower hedonic choice share as a single-
stage decision. This result is consistent with H2, in that reduced prevention focus post-
shortlisting accounts for the increased hedonic choice share in two-stage decisions. 
Third, these results allow us to address various potential alternative accounts of why 
decision makers may prefer hedonic options in two-stage decision-making. For instance, 
decision-makers have been shown to have a greater hedonic preference with smaller choice sets. 
This is said to occur due to a lesser need for choice justification when decision makers are faced 
with smaller choice sets (Sela et al., 2009). This account is inconsistent with the pattern of results 
we observe, as this alternative account would have predicted that the hedonic choice share would 
be equally high in all two-stage conditions.  
Further, decision-makers have also been shown to have greater hedonic preference after 
exerting greater effort (Kivetz & Simonson, 2006), after feeling depleted (Vohs et al., 2008), or 
on experiencing cognitive load (Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999). These accounts would suggest that 
hedonic choice share would—if anything—be higher in both conditions that involved 
incremental writing (i.e., after both prevention and promotion primes), because the writing tasks 
add additional content and activity. However, this was not the case in this study.  
These results are also inconsistent with licensing (Khan & Dhar, 2006). The licensing 
effect occurs when decision-makers view their prior behavior as virtuous, which enhances their 
self-concept and leads to greater choice of self-indulgent options. For instance, decision-makers 
deciding in two stages may interpret their inclusion of a utilitarian candidate into the shortlist as 
virtuous, which licenses them to choose a hedonic candidate. Alternatively, using a looser 
definition of “licensing”, decision-makers may feel that by shortlisting, they were careful with 
their decision, and hence virtuous. Yet, for licensing to occur, “expressing only an intention to 
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commit a virtuous act is sufficient”; the virtuous act need not be carried out (Khan & Dhar, 2006, 
p. 262). Therefore, Study 1’s prevention prime should not have moderated the licensing effect, 
because participants were able to express their virtuous behavior (e.g., being careful) in the 
shortlisting stage, regardless of whether a prevention prime was inserted afterward.  
Taken together, the results of Study 1 are inconsistent with various potential alternative 
accounts that lead to increased hedonic choice share, but are consistent with the regulatory focus 
account proposed in H2. However, Study 1 is silent about whether two-stage decision-making 
only reduces prevention focus prior to the final choice stage, or whether it increases promotion 
focus as well. We address this issue in Study 2, by measuring promotion focus and prevention 
focus separately.  
 
Study 2: Apartment Choice 
Study 2 tests our proposed effect of two-stage decision-making in an apartment choice 
task. This domain is appropriate for our investigation, because apartment decisions have been 
studied in the research on two-stage decisions (Ge et al., 2012). Moreover, past research on 
hedonic-utilitarian tradeoffs has also studied apartment choices (Dhar & Wertenbroch, 2000), 
and in general, apartment choices are highly involving. Finally, we believe that real-world 
apartment realtors can encourage a two-stage decision-process, even with small choice sets. For 
instance, an apartment realtor may present an initial set of options to a client, and then might 
suggest that this client shortlist a set of options to consider further. Also, this kind of shortlisting 
is also encouraged by apartment-rental websites. 
We created a choice set of four apartments (Appendix B). Hedonic attributes were 
aesthetics of the apartments’ interior, view, and surrounding neighborhood. Utilitarian attributes 
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were accessibility to work, stores, and public transportation. The choice set had two hedonic 
apartments (A and B) and two utilitarian apartments (C and D). Additionally, the choice set had 
two relatively superior options (A and C) and two relatively inferior options (B and D), of both 
hedonic and utilitarian types. As in Study 1, we anticipated that participants would eventually 
choose one of the two superior, "target" options (A and C), thus reducing the potential variance 
in final choices.  
The stimuli were developed through two pretests, similar to Study 1’s pretest. We report 
the pretests’ measures and detailed results in Appendix C. As a brief overview, Pretest 1 verified 
that participants viewed option A as relatively more hedonic and less utilitarian than option C. 
Pretest 2 verified that options A and C were perceived as superior to options B and D, 
respectively. 
Consistent with our main prediction (H1), we expected that two-stage (vs. single-stage) 
decisions will increase choice of the relatively more hedonic option (A) from this apartment 
choice set. Please note that we group three studies, 2A, 2B, and 2C under the heading ‘Study 2.’ 
All these studies involve an apartment choice task, and use the same stimuli (described above). 
However, each study tests different aspects of our predictions, and shows the robustness of the 
effect in different ways, as we explain in the introduction of each study.2 
 
Study 2A 
The purpose of Study 2A was to replicate our main finding on hedonic choice share, and 
also to test our proposed process mechanism, but this time using mediation analyses. 
Procedure. Participants (N = 76 U.K.-based participants, paid £10 each) completed a 
computer-based survey. We manipulated structure of the decision process between-subjects as 
                                                      
2 We thank our anonymous reviewers for motivating Studies 2B and 2C. 
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either two-stage (shortlist-then-choose) or single-stage (straight-choice). On the first webpage, 
all participants imagined that they needed to rent an apartment in a large city. On the second 
webpage, they read information on four apartment options (described above), taking as much 
time as they liked. At this point, they simply reviewed the options and did not make any 
decisions. As such, all participants had the same “awareness set.” On the third webpage, they 
saw this choice set again, but here instructions for the two conditions diverged. 
Participants in the single-stage condition picked one apartment by clicking on an option. 
In contrast, participants in the two-stage condition were asked to shortlist two apartments that 
they would consider further. Then, on a fourth webpage, two-stage participants saw all four 
options again, but the non-shortlisted options had inactive radio buttons. We retained the non-
shortlisted options on this webpage, to ensure that the number of alternatives visible during final 
choice was constant across the single-stage and two-stage conditions. Two-stage participants 
made their final choice out of their two shortlisted options on this fourth webpage. 
After the final choice, participants responded to two questions that elicited regulatory 
focus. They indicated the extent to which they agreed (1 = “Disagree,” 7 = “Agree”) with two 
statements: (a) “Earlier, when I was making my final choice for an apartment, I was mainly 
trying to pick a good option.” (promotion focus measure), and (b) “Earlier, when I was making 
my final choice for an apartment, I was mainly trying to avoid a bad option.” (prevention focus 
measure). These two questions were displayed on separate screens, with order counter-balanced. 
Like earlier work, we used single-item regulatory focus scales and assessed these after the key 
dependent variable (Wan, Hong, & Sternthal, 2009; Zhou & Pham, 2004). In particular, we 
adapted Zhou & Pham’s (2004) scale, in which participants were asked about the extent to which 
their monetary decision was driven by a desire to gain money or to avoid losing money. 
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Results. Consistent with H1, choice share of the target hedonic option (A) was higher in 
the two-stage (60.5%) than in the single-stage condition (36.8%, binomial z = 2.13, p < .05, n = 
76). Across conditions, during the final choice, no participants selected the decoy hedonic option 
B, and only two participants selected the decoy utilitarian option D. Results replicated when 
defining hedonic choice as [A + B] and utilitarian choice as [C + D]. Most participants in the 
two-stage condition (26 out of 38) shortlisted the one superior hedonic option (A) and the one 
superior utilitarian option (C). Restricting the analysis to only those two-stage participants who 
had shortlisted options A and C led to a similar pattern of results.3 
As predicted by H2, prevention focus was significantly lower in the two-stage versus 
single-stage condition (MTwo-Stage = 3.26, SD = 1.88 vs. MSingle-Stage = 5.18, SD = 1.99, F(1, 74) = 18.59, 
p < .01). However, promotion focus did not significantly differ between conditions (MTwo-Stage = 
6.29, SD = 0.80 vs. MSingle-Stage = 6.11, SD = 1.18, F(1, 74) = 0.63, p = .43). Therefore, relative to 
the single-stage condition, in the two-stage condition, prevention focus dissipated, while 
promotion focus remained intact.4 
Next, we examined whether prevention focus mediated the relationship between structure 
of the decision process and hedonic choice share. Supporting H2, this analysis (per procedures in 
Preacher and Hayes 2008) exhibited complete mediation; please see Figure 2. That is, when 
prevention focus was the mediator, we found no direct effects of single-stage versus two-stage 
decision-making (the independent variable) on hedonic choice share (the dependent variable) (p 
=.32). Moreover, the indirect mediation effect (i.e., the effect of the independent variable on the 
                                                      
3 Results replicate when restricting the analysis to single-stage participants and two-stage participants who only 
shortlisted A + C (n = 64). Just considering these participants, hedonic choice share was higher than that of the 
single-stage condition (73.1% vs. 36.8%, binomial z = 3.10, p < .01). 
 
4 Note that the correlation between the prevention and promotion items was not significant (r = 0.08, p = .47) Prior 
work has found that the two scales are either not significantly correlated, or exhibit a modest, positive correlation 
(Haws et al., 2010; Table 2).  
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dependent variable via prevention focus) was significant, with the 95% confidence interval not 
including zero (0.02 to 1.24).  
-Insert Figure 2 about here- 
 
Study 2B 
 The purpose of Study 2B (N = 89, U.S. undergraduates) was to test the robustness of 
Study 2A’s mediation findings. Study 2B’s design (single-stage vs. two-stage between-subjects), 
choice set, and procedures were identical to Study 2A. There were only two changes (in 
comparison to Study 2A), related to the regulatory focus measure.  
First, regulatory focus was elicited before final choice (vs. after final choice in Study 
2A). This change was introduced to address the potential concern that in Study 2A the mediator 
(i.e., regulatory focus) could have been unduly influenced by the dependent variable (i.e., 
choice), and that the observed self-reports of regulatory focus might simply reflect a need for 
consistency. 
Second, the regulatory focus measure was adapted from a different paper in this literature 
(Wan et al., 2009). Participants indicated the extent to which they agreed (1 = “Disagree,” 9 = 
“Agree”) with two statements:  “I am looking to avoid negative outcomes” (prevention focus) 
and “I am looking to achieve positive outcomes” (promotion focus). Besides the aim of using a 
different regulatory focus measure, this change was also introduced to address a potential 
concern that the items used to tap on to promotion and prevention concerns in Study 2A might 
have been too closely tied to the apartment choice task. For example, when participants in the 
two-stage condition agreed with the prevention focus statement in Study 2A (“I was mainly 
trying to avoid a bad option”), they might have simply been acknowledging that they did indeed 
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eliminate some bad options via the shortlisting step. Thus, prevention self-reports in Study 2A 
might not have been truly reflective of the prevention focus that was being experienced. Rather, 
they could have simply reflected participants’ acknowledgement of a key feature of the task that 
they had engaged in (i.e., shortlisting). Using Wan et al.’s (2009) more general mindset measure, 
as well as administering this measure prior to the dependent variable, addresses the above 
concerns.  
Results. Consistent with Study 2A’s results and H1, choice share of the target hedonic 
option (A) was higher in the two-stage versus single-stage condition (71.1% vs. 31.8%, binomial 
z = 4.03, p < .01, n = 89).5 Further, prevention focus was significantly lower in the two-stage 
than in the single-stage condition (MTwo-Stage = 5.98, SD = 1.60 vs. MSingle-Stage = 7.91, SD = 1.12, F(1, 
87) = 43.33, p < .01), but promotion focus did not significantly differ between conditions (MTwo-Stage 
= 8.00, SD = 1.26 vs. MSingle-Stage = 7.82, SD = 1.29, F(1, 87) = 0.45, p = .51)6. Finally, supporting 
H2, differences in prevention focus fully mediated differences in choice shares, with the 95% 
confidence interval for the indirect effect not including zero (0.18 to 1.83); please see Figure 3.  
 
-Insert Figure 3 about here- 
Study 2C 
 
Study 2C (N = 253, U.S. undergraduates) also uses the same stimuli, but with a different 
objective. We wanted to address an alternative account that hedonic choice share differences are 
driven by the smaller choice set that participants ultimately view in two-stage decisions (Sela et 
al., 2009). For instance, one could argue that in the final stage of the apartment studies’ two-
                                                      
5 In study 2B, no participant chose the relatively inferior option B, and only three participants chose the relatively 
inferior option D. 
6 The prevention and promotion items had a modest, positive correlation (r = 0.29, p < .01). 
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stage decisions, participants only had to view two apartments, whereas in the single-stage 
condition, they had to view four apartments, and that this difference in choice-set size may 
explain the greater hedonic choice share in the two-stage condition. 
While we do not believe that choice set size differences can account for all our past 
findings, Study 2C includes additional conditions to specifically address this account. Study 2C 
used a four-cell between-subjects design. As in studies 2A and 2B, two conditions involve 
reading about four apartment options and then deciding in either a single-stage or a two-stage 
format. Further, in another condition (small-set choice), we ask participants to choose only 
between the two relatively superior options (A and C), in a single-stage format.7 These 
participants were never exposed to the relatively inferior options (B and D), so in the final choice 
stage they only viewed two apartments, just like in the two-stage condition, but they pick in a 
single-stage.  
In still another single-stage condition (unavailable-set choice), participants read about all 
four apartments, but they were told that two options are unavailable. These ‘unavailable’ 
apartments were the relatively inferior apartments (B and D). The task instructions made no 
association between option unavailability and option inferiority. That is, participants were not 
told that B and D were unavailable because they were relatively poor. Instead, they were simply 
made unavailable (i.e., with inactive radio buttons) without any further explanation. Therefore, 
including this condition allows us to test whether the concept of unavailability activated post-
shortlisting can account for the higher hedonic choice share in two-stage decision-making. 
In Study 2C, we predict higher hedonic choice share in the two-stage condition versus all 
three single-stage conditions (i.e., control, small-set choice, unavailable-set choice). This is 
consistent with our account that two-stage decisions increase hedonic choice share, because the 
                                                      
7 In this condition, apartment options were re-labeled as A and B. 
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shortlisting stage draws attention to the fact that relatively inferior choice options have been 
actively eliminated. This implication is entirely absent when the choice set simply never had 
inferior options to begin with (small-set choice condition) or when the inferior options were 
unavailable for other reasons (unavailable-set choice condition). These predictions, if borne out 
by the results, should further highlight the critical role of the act of shortlisting.   
Results. Consistent with Study 2A’s results and H1, choice share of the target hedonic 
option (A) was higher in the two-stage condition (55.6%) versus single-stage control (26.4%), 
small-set choice (27.4%) and unavailable-set choice (36.9%) conditions. All contrasts between 
the two-stage condition and the single-stage conditions were significant (all binomial z > 2.07, p 
< .05), but none of the contrasts between the three single-stage conditions was significant (all 
binomial z < 1.32, p > .19). Restricting the analysis to only those participants who had either 
chosen or shortlisted the two dominant options (A and C) revealed a similar pattern of results, as 
only 18 (out of 253) participants chose or shortlisted inferior apartment options. 
 
Discussion  
Studies 2A, 2B, and 2C all replicated our finding that two-stage decisions increase 
hedonic preference relative to single-stage decisions. Further, studies 2A and 2B found evidence 
for our proposed regulatory focus mechanism (H2), this time using mediation analyses. These 
studies show that only decision-makers’ prevention focus (and not their promotion focus) is 
influenced by a shortlisting stage. Across studies 2A and 2B, we used different regulatory focus 
scales from the literature (Zhou & Pham, 2004; Wan et al., 2009), and we presented these scales 
either before (Study 2A) or after (Study 2B) the final choice. The mediation results generalized 
across these measurement differences, thereby showing the robustness of our proposed 
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mechanism. Finally, Study 2C helped address competing explanations related to choice set size 
(Sela et al., 2009) and option unavailability. Next, we test our predictions in an incentive-
compatible choice task. 
 
Study 3: Choice of Pen Option 
Study 3 further generalizes our results in the domain of pens, which has been studied in 
past work on two-stage decision-making (Larson & Hamilton, 2012). We group two related 
studies, Study 3A and 3B, under the heading ‘Study 3’, because both involve a pen choice task 
and have similar procedures. Yet, each study contributes to our findings in different ways. 
 
Study 3A 
Study 3A is an initial test of our proposed effect in an incentive-compatible pen choice 
task. Participants were asked to choose a pen option, and told that they will actually receive their 
chosen option at the end of the study. The choice options were (counter-balanced): (A) a set of 
three Bic brand pens that were plain in decoration, (B) one pen emblazoned with the university’s 
name and colors, and (C) a used pen of uncertain quality and vintage. We expected that the used 
pen would be perceived as a dominated pen. We also expected that the university pen would be 
perceived as more hedonic (and less utilitarian) than the Bic pen set, and this was borne out in 
our pre-test results (Appendix C). Therefore, we expect higher choice share of the university pen 
under two-stage (vs. single-stage) decision-making. 
Procedure. Undergraduate students (N = 133) participated in a 3-cell (single-stage-
control, two-stage, small-set choice) between-subjects design. In the single-stage-control and 
two-stage conditions, participants encountered the three pen options at the start of the task and 
28 
 
eventually chose one option, in a single-stage or two-stage fashion, respectively. In contrast, in 
the small-set choice condition, Option C (i.e., dominated pen) was never mentioned. This was a 
straight choice with only two options (pen options A and B), like the small-set choice condition 
reported in Study 2C.  
The study instructions were administered on a computer in a lab. On the first webpage, 
participants learned that they would choose a pen option to take home. On the second webpage, 
they read a written description of the available options. On the third webpage, procedures 
diverged. Single-stage participants raised their hand, at which point a lab proctor came by to 
show them the pen options that they read about earlier (i.e., three options in the single-stage 
control and two options in the small-set choice). They were free to look at the pens for as long as 
they wanted to. The lab proctor then took the pen options back, and then participants indicated 
their final choice. Two-stage condition participants read about all three pen options, then 
shortlisted two pen options, then raised their hand to have the proctor present them only the two 
shortlisted pen options, after which they indicated their final choice. Thus, two-stage participants 
saw some new information after shortlisting, in this case the actual physical appearance of the 
pens, but this “new” information was not substantially different from what they had learned in 
reading about the pen options prior to shortlisting. Moreover, participants in the single-stage 
conditions had also got to visually inspect the pens, as part of the single-stage condition. Thus 
the critical difference between the two-stage and single-stage conditions is the presence or 
absence of a shortlisting phase. At the end of the lab session, participants received their chosen 
pen option. 
Results. As predicted, hedonic choice share (i.e., choice of the university-labeled pen) 
was greater in the two-stage condition (76.6%) than either the single-stage condition (56.82%) or 
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the single-stage, small-set condition (54.8%; both comparisons, binomial z > 2.1, p < .05). 
Nobody shortlisted or chose the dominated pen (Option C).  
 
Study 3B 
In Study 3B, we sought to replicate these findings in another incentive-compatible pens 
choice task. This study differed from Study 3A in two ways. First, we designed Study 3B’s 
choice set such that none of the options was dominated. This helps generalize the findings to 
decisions that do not have a clear dominance structure. More specifically, Study 3B includes the 
same Options A and B (i.e., Bic pen set and university logo pen), as in Study 3A, but Option C 
was another (generally acceptable) hedonic option. This pen had a basketball hoop on top and a 
plastic basketball attached by a string. Our pre-test, reported in Appendix C, confirmed that the 
Bic pen set was perceived as more utilitarian and less hedonic than the other two options, which 
were similar to each other on both criteria. Thus, we expected that choice of either hedonic 
option (i.e., options B or C) would be greater in a two-stage (vs. single-stage) decision.  
A second purpose of Study 3B is that we sought to show additional evidence for process 
in a mediation analysis. Critically, unlike our measures reported in studies 2A and 2B, the 
regulatory focus measure we use in Study 3B is entirely unrelated to the choice task under 
consideration. Consistent with past work (Higgins et al., 1994; Zhou & Pham, 2004), we 
reasoned that a decision-maker’s prevailing regulatory focus levels tend to color responses for all 
kinds of goal-related judgment tasks. Thus, we should be able to detect differences in regulatory 
focus via a goal-related task that is unrelated to the choice of pens. Such a finding would help to 
counter any choice justification account for our mediation process evidence. 
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Procedure. Undergraduate students (N = 97) participated in a 2-cell (single-stage vs. two-
stage) between-subjects design. Study 3B’s procedures were similar to those of Study 3A, with 
only two differences. First, the choice set was different; as described above, we replaced the 
dominated pen with a hedonic, generally acceptable basketball pen. Second, after the final 
choice, participants responded to a prompt that measured regulatory focus in a completely 
unrelated domain. We used the commonly employed “friendship strategy” measure of regulatory 
focus (Higgins et al., 1994; Zhou & Pham, 2004). Participants were asked to choose three of six 
possible strategies for friendship. Of the six strategies presented, three were promotion-oriented 
(e.g., “be generous and willing to give of myself”), and three were prevention-oriented (e.g., 
“stay in touch and avoid losing contact with my friends”). Here, the number of prevention-
oriented strategies chosen is the mirror of the number of promotion-oriented strategies chosen.  
Results. Consistent with H1 and prior studies, hedonic choice share (i.e., choice of either 
the university-labeled or basketball pen) was higher in the two-stage (65.3%) versus the single-
stage condition (39.6%, binomial z = 2.53, p < .01). This effect was not driven by the 
composition of the shortlists. The utilitarian, Bic pen set was shortlisted with the university-
labeled pen by 69.4% of participants, and 22.4% of participants shortlisted the Bic option and the 
basketball pen. Only four participants shortlisted both hedonic options, and the choice share 
results held when excluding these participants (revised two-stage hedonic choice share = 62.2%; 
binomial z = 2.18, p < .05). Thus, shortlists overwhelmingly included one hedonic and one 
utilitarian option.8 
                                                      
8 Choice share for the utilitarian Bic pen set was similar between the two common shortlists. The Bic option was 
chosen by 38.2% of participants that composed a Bic + university logo pen shortlist and by 36.4% of participants 
that composed a Bic + basketball pen shortlist. 
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Consistent with H2, the number of prevention-oriented friendship strategies chosen (out 
of 3) was greater in the single-stage (M = 1.69, SD = 0.83) versus the two-stage condition (M = 
1.31, SD = 0.90; t(95) = -2.17, p < .05). We conducted a mediation analysis, using the number of 
prevention-oriented friendship strategies chosen as our measure of regulatory focus. When the 
number of prevention-oriented friendship strategies chosen was the mediator, the direct effect of 
two-stage decision-making reduced, from p = .01 to p = 0.04, indicating partial mediation. 
Moreover, the indirect mediation effect was significant, with the 95% confidence interval not 
including zero (0.01 to 0.65), see Figure 4.  
-Insert Figure 4 about here- 
  
Discussion  
Taken together, the results of studies 3A and 3B replicate our previous findings in a 
different domain, choice of a pen option. Importantly, because both these studies involved 
consequential choices, these studies also increase our confidence that our predictions would hold 
in many other settings as well. Study 3A replicated the finding (reported in Study 2B) that a 
single-stage, small-set choice had lower hedonic choice share than a two-stage decision, which 
helps to counter the choice set size alternative explanation (Sela et al., 2009). Further, Study 3B 
found additional evidence for our proposed regulatory focus mechanism, using mediation 
analyses. 
These studies generalize our findings in three ways. First, in both studies, some new 
minor information was presented after shortlisting (i.e., the pen’s actual physical appearance), 
suggesting that shortlisting can increase hedonic preference in many other choice tasks. Second, 
Study 3B showed that the result also holds when none of the options in the choice set is 
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dominated. In this study, none of the options was dominated, and so shortlists were idiosyncratic. 
Third, Study 3B also involved a more generalized regulatory focus measure. In particular, this 
measure was multi-item, and unrelated to the choice task under consideration, thus allowing us to 
counter choice justification accounts of the mediation results. These findings also suggest that 
two-stage decisions might have interesting “spillover” effects on subsequent, unrelated tasks. 
 
Study 4: Snack Options 
 In Study 4, we test our predictions in the domain of snacks. Like in Study 3B, the choice 
set does not include any dominated items. The two key contributions of this study are that (1) 
unlike our previous studies, Study 4’s initial choice set and shortlists are both larger, and (2) the 
choice options were written to be even simpler to process.  
 
Procedures 
Participants (N = 70 U.S. undergraduates) completed an online survey about choosing a 
mid-afternoon snack. They were shown eight Nature Valley granola bar options (e.g., 
Strawberry, Oatmeal-Raisin, etc.) and eight Ben & Jerry’s ice cream cup options (e.g., Cherry 
Garcia, Monkey Ice, etc.). Each option only showed the name of the product, with no description 
or image. In the single-stage condition, participants picked one item. In the two-stage condition, 
participants (i) shortlisted four options, and then (ii) from this shortlist, chose an option.  
Pretest 
A separate set of participants (N = 35 U.S. undergraduates) categorized the items as either 
utilitarian or hedonic. Specifically, they categorized each snack as either (i) “necessary, 
practical, functional, helpful, and effective”, or (ii) “enjoyable, fun, delightful, exciting, and 
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thrilling” (Spangenberg et al., 1997), with the latter categorization reflecting a hedonic 
classification. Ice cream cups were more likely to be classified as hedonic options (PHedonic = 94% 
to 100%) than granola bars (PHedonic = 20% to 34%). All pair-wise comparisons between each of 
the 8 granola bars versus each of the 8 ice cream cups were significant (all binomial zs > 5.0; ps < 
.01). Therefore, hedonic preference is reflected as a greater choice share of ice cream cups.  
Results  
Consistent with H1, hedonic choice-share (i.e., choice of ice cream cups) was greater in 
the two-stage (vs. single-stage) condition (71.8% vs. 48.4%, binomial z = 2.03, p < .05). As in 
previous studies, composition of the shortlists was not primarily utilitarian; the majority of 
shortlists had equal numbers of utilitarian and hedonic options. More specifically, the proportion 
of participants in the two-stage condition who formed each type of consideration sets were as 
follows: (a) 1 granola bar - 3 ice creams = 35.9%, (b) 2 granola bars - 2 ice creams = 51.3%, and 
(c) 3 granola bars - 1 ice cream = 12.8%. None of the participants formed a shortlist with only 
granola bars or only ice-cream cups.  
Discussion 
Study 4 was distinct from prior studies in various ways. First, it used a relatively large 
choice set (i.e., 16 items here vs. 4 candidates, 4 apartments and 3 pen options in earlier studies). 
Further, it showed that the hypothesized effect is not limited to decision scenarios where explicit 
attribute descriptions make the hedonic-utilitarian tradeoff apparent, as here no attribute 
descriptions were provided. In contrast, prior work on two-stage decisions has largely 
concentrated on decision scenarios with explicit attribute descriptions (e.g., Beach, 1993, 
Chakravarti et al., 2006, Ge et al., 2012). Finally, like Study 3B, it showed that the key effect 
sustains even when the choice set does not include dominated options. Related to the last point, 
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note that an Oatmeal-Raisin flavor granola bar is not necessarily a better utilitarian option than a 
Strawberry flavor granola bar; likewise, the Cherry Garcia flavor ice cream is not necessarily a 
better hedonic option than Monkey Ice flavor ice cream. As such, participants composed 
shortlists based on their idiosyncratic preferences, rather than drawing off a clear dominance 
ordering within the stimuli. This is an important departure from the hiring and apartment choice 
studies, and increases the generalizability of the documented effect. 
 
General Discussion 
Summary of Findings 
This research documents a novel effect: two-stage decisions (vs. single-stage decisions), 
enhance preference for relatively hedonic (vs. utilitarian) options. The effect we outline is robust 
and replicates across multiple studies that differed in (i) choice domains (employees, apartments, 
snacks, pens), (ii) type of attribute information (e.g., text description vs. names vs. pictures), (iii) 
choice set parameters (3 to 16 options; presence vs. absence of dominated options), and (iv) 
participant populations (e.g., U.S. vs. European participants, students vs. mTurk workers, etc.). 
We also demonstrated the underlying regulatory focus-based process mechanism using both 
moderation and mediation analyses. 
Theoretical Contributions 
This research advances work on two-stage decision-making by showing that the structure 
of the decision impacts hedonic-utilitarian tradeoffs. In comparison, past work has only shown 
how two-stage decision-making affects information processing, such as relatively lesser 
weighting of (i) information presented in the first stage (Chakravarti et al., 2006, Ge et al., 2012), 
or (ii) attributes that have been used in the first stage (Larson & Hamilton, 2012). Past work has 
35 
 
not, to the best of our knowledge, found any effects that differ by the type of attributes (e.g., 
hedonic vs. utilitarian) considered during decision making. Thus, our work is the first to show 
that two-stage (vs. single-stage) decisions systematically enhance hedonic preference.  
The results of the present work build upon and extend prior findings on the violation of 
procedure invariance in decision-making (Slovic, 1995). Past research has found that procedural 
differences, such as the task purpose (e.g., choice vs. matching; Tversky, Sattath, & Slovic, 
1988) and the framing of the outcomes (e.g., gains vs. losses; Frisch, 1993; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1981), influence preferences. We show that a formal demarcation of a decision, into 
two stages, can similarly act as a subtle difference in procedure that influences final choices. 
This effect is important to document and understand, because many decisions are either naturally 
demarcated into two stages, or can be artificially demarcated as such, to influence preference. 
Implications for Managers 
Our findings have important managerial implications. First, our findings apply to many 
organizational and managerial decisions. For example, these results can generalize to workplace 
situations in which employees have to choose between projects that differ on utilitarian criteria 
(e.g., payment, work hours, etc.) and hedonic criteria (e.g., enjoyment, office facilities, etc.). 
Managers can influence such choices by structuring these decisions as either a single-stage or a 
two-stage decision. As another example, consider the fact that organizational hiring decisions 
very often occur in two stages (e.g., preliminary CV-based shortlisting, followed by in-person 
interviews). In these cases, managers are (implicitly) more likely to focus on the job candidates’ 
hedonic characteristics (e.g., affability) in the final choice stage. If this issue is problematic, then 
managers should implement suitable moderating mechanisms to ensure that the organization 
gives suitable weight to pertinent utilitarian characteristics of the shortlisted candidates.  
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Second, the finding that two-stage decisions enhance hedonic preference is important in 
consumer decisions with hedonic-utilitarian tradeoffs. Examples of such domains could be like 
the ones we examined in our research (e.g., apartments, snacks, and pens) or others, including 
the choice of hotel rooms, vacation destinations, choice of cars (sports cars vs. sedans) and 
recreational activities (movies vs. museums), etc. This issue of two-stage versus single-stage 
decisions is highly pertinent in online environments where websites often prompt consumers and 
managers to create shortlists (e.g., Google Shopping’s “My Shortlist” tool, all-paris-
apartments.com’s “shortlist” tool, or Human Resources websites with “candidate shortlist” 
tools). Further, as consumers are often “on-guard” against overt sales tactics, our findings have 
implications for personal selling situations (e.g., a real estate agent trying to sell an expensive 
residential property). In such situations, a skilled salesperson can subtly structure the sales 
process (i.e., single-stage vs. two-stage) and influence choice.  
Limitations and Future Research 
We primarily studied situations in which there was a tradeoff where some options were 
relatively high-hedonic/low-utilitarian, and other options were relatively high-utilitarian/low-
hedonic. To test our proposed effect, we examined choice shares of these options. However, 
according to our framework, two-stage decision-making should more generally enhance 
preference for hedonic characteristics, and so the effects should apply to other forms of hedonic-
utilitarian tradeoffs. For instance, there may be a set of all high-hedonic/low-utilitarian options 
within a choice domain (e.g., vacations) and a decision-maker must decide whether to purchase 
within this category, or to go with a no-choice or choice deferral option. In this situation, the 
decision-maker must weigh the hedonic benefits of the purchase against the implicit utilitarian 
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costs (e.g., time needed for work projects, health-related goals, etc.). Examining such instances 
are worthwhile research extensions. 
We only examined situations in which the entire decision takes place within a short time 
frame. Would the effects replicate in longer decisions, such as choice of a university to attend, 
when the shortlisting and final choice stage are separated by a substantial time gap? In these 
situations, decision-makers may forget that they reduced the presence of undesirable options 
when composing a shortlist, and this might turn off our proposed effect. Given these 
possibilities, future research should test the moderating role of inter-stage time-interval. 
Research suggests that prevention focus not only affects hedonic-utilitarian tradeoffs—
our topic of inquiry—but it also affects preferences for risky versus risk-free options, temporally 
distant versus proximal options, and other attribute tradeoffs (Higgins, 1997). Studying how the 
mechanism identified in our work applies to other tradeoffs would be a worthwhile extension. 
For example, future research could examine whether two-stage decisions lead to greater 
preference for risky (vs. risk-free) options in investments, new product launches, insurance 
choices, and other such risk-related decisions. Taken together, the theoretical framework and 
findings presented in this manuscript provide an important step towards understanding how 
differences in the structure of the decision process influence choices. We hope that the findings 
in this paper stimulate further work in this area, in a variety of decision domains.  
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FIGURE 1: CHOICE SHARE OF HEDONIC CANDIDATE IN STUDY 1 
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FIGURE 2: MEDIATION ANALYSIS IN STUDY 2A 
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FIGURE 3: MEDIATION ANALYSIS IN STUDY 2B 
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FIGURE 4: MEDIATION ANALYSIS IN STUDY 3B 
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APPENDIX A: CANDIDATE STIMULI USED IN STUDY 1 
 
Candidate A 
(Hedonic focus) 
Candidate B 
(Hedonic focus) 
Candidate C 
(Utilitarian focus) 
Candidate D 
(Utilitarian focus) 
5 years of IT experience. 
Spent the 10 years prior as 
a musician. Good 
knowledge of the software 
that your office uses, and 
may be able to quickly 
learn about the hardware 
your office uses. 
3 years of IT 
experience. Fairly 
good knowledge of 
software, but has no 
familiarity with the 
hardware that your 
office uses. 
15 years of IT 
experience. Very good 
knowledge of both the 
hardware and software 
that your office uses. 
Very highly skilled. 
7 years of IT experience. 
IT knowledge is good, 
but not remarkable. 
Very interesting person 
with lots of exciting 
hobbies. Affable and kind, 
and would make a great 
work-friend to those in 
your office. 
Nice person to talk to. 
Seems to get along 
with people. 
Professional demeanor, 
but a boring person to 
talk to. Simply does the 
IT work and talks about 
computers a lot. 
Quite awkward in the 
interview. May have a 
difficult time 
communicating with 
others. 
Is willing to work under 
the terms that your office 
has set for the IT position. 
Has asked for a salary 
that exceeds what 
your office is willing 
to pay. The salary 
expected by this 
candidate is 
unreasonably high. 
Is willing to work under 
the terms that your 
office has set for the IT 
position. 
Has asked for the first 2 
months to be part-time 
to attend to another 
personal project. Once 
working full-time, 
would like to arrive later 
in the morning than 
other employees. 
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APPENDIX B: APARTMENT STIMULI USED IN STUDY 2 
 
Apartment A 
(Hedonic focus) 
Apartment B 
(Hedonic focus) 
Apartment C 
(Utilitarian focus) 
Apartment D 
(Utilitarian focus) 
Not close to work (45 
minute drive) 
Quite far to drive (55 
minutes) 
Very close to work (5 
minute drive) 
Quite close to work (10 
minute drive) 
There is a convenience 
store four blocks away, 
but there are no grocery 
stores in the vicinity 
There are no 
convenience stores or 
grocery stores in the 
vicinity 
Located near many 
grocery stores, a 
pharmacy and a 
laundromat  
Located near a grocery 
store and a laundromat  
Train and local bus stops 
are a 15 minute drive 
away  
Train and local bus 
stops are a 20 minute 
drive  
The train station and 
local bus stops are 
located only 2 blocks 
away  
A local bus stop is 
located a few blocks 
away  
In a quiet and hip 
neighborhood 
In a nice 
neighborhood, that 
can get noisy at times 
On a busy avenue with a 
steady stream of traffic  
On a busy avenue with a 
steady stream of traffic 
Large bay windows 
overlooking the tree-lined 
streets, with clear views of 
the river 
Nice windows 
overlooking a 
children’s playground 
with a river view 
Windows overlooking a 
parking lot 
The one small window 
overlooks the adjacent 
building 
Spacious layout, 
hardwood floors, and a 
nice balcony  
Moderately spacious 
layout, hardwood 
floors and a nice 
balcony  
The apartment is kind of 
cramped  
The apartment is very 
small and cramped  
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APPENDIX C 
 
 
Pretest 1, Studies 2A-C 
This pretest examined whether participants viewed option A as relatively more hedonic 
and less utilitarian than option C. Participants (N = 66 U.S. undergraduates, participating for 
course credit) read apartment descriptions, and then rated each apartment using the same five-
item hedonic-utilitarian scales described in Study 1 (both scales, α > 0.8, Spangenberg et al., 
1997), but the scale was 5-point (1 = “not at all”, 5 = “extremely”). The ratings confirmed our 
intended design, as reflected by differences across options on hedonic ratings (MA = 3.26; MB = 
2.77; MC = 2.22; MD = 1.96) and on utilitarian ratings (MA = 2.39; MB = 1.97; MC = 3.89; MD = 
3.64); apartment A had the highest hedonic rating and apartment C had the highest utilitarian 
rating. Both comparisons between options A and C (i.e., differences in hedonic and utilitarian 
ratings for A and C) were significant (ts(65) > 2.7; p < .01).  
 
Pretest 2, Studies 2A-C 
This pretest examined whether options A and C were perceived as superior to options B 
and D, respectively. Participants (N = 21 U.S. undergraduates, participating for course credit) 
chose between (i) A and B (the hedonic apartments), and then chose between (ii) C and D (the 
utilitarian apartments), separately. Participants overwhelmingly (Ms > 95%) chose A and C, over 
B and D, respectively (binomial zs > 3.9, ps < .01). 
 
 
Pretest 3, Study 3A 
Pre-test participants (N = 61 undergraduates, at the same university where Study 3A was 
held) read a description of the three pen options, looked at the pens, and then ranked them on 
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hedonic and utilitarian criteria separately (based on scale items in Study 1). For hedonic 
rankings, 68.85% of participants ranked the university-labeled pen as highest. For the utilitarian 
rankings, 90.16% of participants ranked the Bic pen set as highest. The used pen had a modal 
rank of #3 on both rankings. Thus, pre-test results indicated that (i) the university-labeled pen 
was perceived as more hedonic and less utilitarian than the set of Bic brand pens, and (ii) the 
used pen was perceived as inferior to the other two pen options on both dimensions. Another pre-
test, using ratings instead of rankings, confirmed the same results and showed that the used pen 
was perceived as inferior on both hedonic and utilitarian criteria. 
 
Pretest 4, Study 3B 
Pre-test participants (N = 84 undergraduates at the same university, where Study 3B was 
held) read a description of one of the three pen options (Bic pen set, university logo pen, 
basketball pen), and then rated the shown option on hedonic and utilitarian criteria (5-item, 7-
point scales, see items in Study 1). On hedonic criteria, the set of Bic pens was rated as 
significantly less hedonic (M=1.96) than each of the other two options (MBasketball = 5.06, 
MUniversity = 4.59; both contrasts, t(81) < 8.28, p < .01). On utilitarian criteria, the set of Bic pens 
was rated as significantly more utilitarian (M = 6.03) than each of the other two options 
(MBasketball = 3.01, MUniversity = 2.86; both t(81) > 8.84, p < .01). The basketball pen and the 
university logo pen were rated as similar, on both hedonic and utilitarian criteria (both t < 1.5, p 
> .14). 
